Ανατριχιαστικό άρθρο προαναγγέλλει σύρραξη Τουρκίας- Ελλάδας!
Στρατιωτικός αναλυτής εξηγεί γιατί η Άγκυρα “προαναγγέλλει” θερμό επεισόδιο Τουρκίας – Ελλάδας
Στρατιωτικός αναλυτής του «intellinews.com», σε εκτενές άρθρο του τονίζει την σημασία από πλευράς Τουρκίας να προκαλέσει μια σύρραξη με την Ελλάδα, υποστηρίζοντας πως έχει ήδη έτοιμες τις θέσεις της για διαπραγμάτευση, όμως για να φτάσει εκεί χρειάζεται ένα… κάτι, που δεν είναι άλλο από θερμό επεισόδιο στο Αιγαίο!
«Εάν το διεθνές δικαστήριο δεν είναι επιλογή, τότε οι φιλοδοξίες της Άγκυρας μπορούν να επιτευχθούν μόνο μετά από μια διαπραγματευτικού τύπου διευθέτηση, ή μια ειρηνευτική διάσκεψη εάν θέλετε, στην οποία όμως Αθήνα και Λευκωσία θα κάνουν παραχωρήσεις που θα είναι τόσο ορατές όσο και δυσάρεστες για Έλληνες και Eλληνο-Κύπριους», αναφέρει χαρακτηριστικά το δημοσίευμα.
«Η Άγκυρα πιθανόν προετοιμάζει ήδη το έδαφος για αυτό το σενάριο, διεκδικώντας όχι μόνο την ΑΟΖ στα νοτιοανατολικά και ανατολικά της Κύπρου, αλλά και το μεγαλύτερο μέρος της ΑΟΖ στα δυτικά και νοτιοδυτικά της Κύπρου. Χωρίς καμία νομική υπόσταση, αυτός ο ισχυρισμός μπορεί να υλοποιηθεί μόνο μετά από κάποια τελική διαπραγμάτευση μετά όμως από κάποιας μορφής ρήξη σε Αιγαίο και Α.Μεσόγειο», προσθέτει.
Το ενδιαφέρον, ή το ανησυχητικό είναι ότι το άρθρο αναφέρει πως αν η Άγκυρα δεν βρει διέξοδο με νομικό τρόπο (το οποίο είναι και το προφανές), τότε θα επιδιώξει σύρραξη με κάθε τρόπο στο Αιγαίο.[....................]
ΟΛΟΚΛΗΡΟ ΤΟ ΑΡΘΡΟ
Ανατριχιαστικό άρθρο προαναγγέλλει σύρραξη Τουρκίας-Eλλάδας
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Will Turkey and Greece fight a war over East Mediterranean gas?
By Gav Don , Visiting Professor at Edinburgh University
November 3, 2020
In early October the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, threatened Turkey with sanctions if the latter continued to take “unilateral action” in the Eastern Mediterranean. The Commission does not move fast and so Turkey’s behaviour between now and the end of the year will receive a leisurely review, probably by March 2021.
The unilateral actions which prompted the President’s threat were inspired by four complex and interrelated Turkish problems, two of which turn on the very likely presence of large gas reserves in Turkey’s southern littoral. The third problem is ownership of improbable marine resources in the Aegean (well explored, fished out long ago and of little commercial value), while the last one is not an energy problem at all, but is no less painful for Turkey. All four problems are governed by International Law, and that is a good place to start.
Two islands, one large, one tiny, prevent Turkey’s EEZ from including the northern half of the East Med Basin. The larger, Cyprus, sits 100 km south of Turkey and interrupts Turkey’s ownership of the eastern half of its littoral. With Cyprus where it is, Turkey’s EEZ only extends 50 km south of the Turkish coast and then stops. Cyprus owns everything south of that (subject to an argument, discussed below).
The smaller island, the Greek territory of Kastellorizo, is a minute speck of land 2 km off Turkey’s south coast about midway between Cyprus and Rhodes. A simple view (and the Greek view) of EEZ definitions would give this small chip of Greece a large triangular EEZ to its south, and would transfer some 40% of Turkey’s continental shelf to Greek ownership. I call this the Kastellorizo Triangle.
Map of the Kastellorizo Triangle and the contested EEZs
Complex geography, complex laws
Turkey’s argument is that the international law of EEZs is not simple, and that argument is a good one. Customary International Law (which governs Turkey, since Ankara has not acceded to UNCLOS) limits the “EEZ effect” of islands in two very significant ways. The first limitation is that where an island lies inside the natural EEZ of another state the island’s EEZ is calculated in part by comparing the relative lengths of coastline of the island and the adjoining state. While the allocation of EEZs does not need to be absolutely proportional to coastline lengths, Customary International Law DOES make them somewhat proportional. The dispute between Colombia and Nicaragua is one relevant authority among many (and the same law applies both in “Custom” and by “Treaty”). In the case of Kastellorizo, the ratios are about 420 km:14 km, or 30:1.
The second limitation is that the EEZ of an island lying within another state’s continental shelf is enhanced if it needs to “connect” to a neighbouring part of the EEZ of its parent state. Kastellorizo would be able to use this provision, since it lies only 70 km north-east of the EEZ projected by Rhodes.
Combining these two rules in the International Court of Justice (ICJ) would be likely to win Kastellorizo a narrow slice of EEZ to its west and a small EEZ extension to its south. The resulting area would probably no more than 1/30th of the 800,000 sq km under dispute and quite likely less. The Kastellorizo Triangle would belong to Turkey. So why does Turkey not simply take the issue to the ICJ?
It’s not just about the Kastellorizo Triange
The answer is that Ankara is playing for much larger wins around Cyprus. Cyprus’ coastline – 600 km – is nearly three times longer than the 200 km of Turkish coastline to its north. The EEZ under dispute amounts to some 50,000 sq km, joining Egypt’s to its south and Syria’s and Lebanon’s to its east. The “coastline” rule would likely award 80-85% of that to Cyprus. After deducting the 6,000 sq km that are unarguably Turkey’s between Cyprus and Turkey, that would leave Turkey winning small southerly extensions of its EEZ east and west of Cyprus in court, leaving the sweet spots south, south-east and south-west of Cyprus as Cypriot territory.
Turkey’s unilateral argument therefore starts with the proposition that its occupation of northern Cyprus gives it a share of the EEZ to its south, either in geographic terms by moving the borders, or failing that as a form of shared equity in Cyprus’ EEZ. Turkey also refuses to recognise the legal existence of Cyprus as a state. In support of its argument Turkey has unilaterally created its own Block structure in the waters south of Cyprus. This position is a non-starter in court, since it is clearly and unequivocally accepted by everyone except Turkey that the Turkish Republic of North Cyprus is not a state – indeed it is a legal fiction – and that Cyprus is. If Turkey took its EEZ hopes to court it would win the Kastellorizo Triangle, but lose everything south of Cyprus. Ankara definitely does NOT want to take that dispute to the ICJ.
Ankara’s naval problem in the Aegean
The third problem, little discussed, is not an energy problem at all, but turns on the International Law of Territorial Waters. These are the waters inside the (currently) 12-mile or 22-km limit which are treated by law as sovereign territory. It is vital to restate at this point that it is only the resources in an EEZ that are sovereign, not the waters themselves. Any state can use the surface and subsurface waters of an EEZ to sail civilian or military traffic without permission from anyone (and it is those uses which are vexing China in the South China Sea, but more on that another time). Permitted uses also include hydrographic surveying, so I can sail my carrier strike group right up to your Territorial Waters border with impunity. It is only economic exploitation that is controlled by the EEZ’s owner.
Territorial Zones are different. While any nation has a right to sail warships through the Territorial Zones of any other nation without permission, this right is limited to a right of “Innocent Passage”. Innocent Passage forbids the use of weapons' radars or sonars and the carrying out of exercises. Most crucially for Turkey, the right of innocent passage requires submarines to sail through Territorial Zones on the surface. Since a large part of the strategic value of a submarine lies in the fact that no-one knows whether or not your submarine is deployed, forcing a boat to deploy on the surface is a big strategic problem. A submarine which transits Territorial Waters dived and without permission is taking its life in its hands, since the Territorial State is fully within its rights to sink the trespasser at will.
In the wide waters of the eastern Mediterranean Territorial Zones give Turkey no trouble. That is not true, though, in the much narrower waters of the Aegean. Here a multiplicity of Greek islands and islets scattered between Turkey and Greece each have their own Territorial Zones. At present Greece has voluntarily, and sensibly, limited its Territorial Zone claims to 11 km, which offers a narrow but navigable non-territorial Aegean channel joining the Sea of Marmara to the Mediterranean. Turkey (or anyone else, including Russia) can sail a dived submarine along this route at will, allowing Ankara to deploy its large and modern submarine force freely. This voluntary reduction of Territorial Waters is not unique – Russia benefits from a similar restraint in the Baltic approaches to St Petersburg, for example.
As part of its dispute with Turkey Greece is threatening to increase its Aegean Territorial Zones to 22 km. That increase is perfectly within its rights. If it did that then Turkey’s route across the Aegean would close, and it would either have to deploy its submarines to the Mediterranean surfaced (thus handing Greece and its allies the ability to track them at will), or sail them dived within a few kilometres of Turkey’s western coast, or take the risk of deploying them dived through Greek territorial waters where they might be detected, attacked and sunk by the Greek navy – operating fully within its legal rights.
The Turkish “inshore route” is practical until boats try to pass the Mycale Strait between Samos and Turkey. Here Turkish Territorial Waters narrow to less than half a kilometre and water depths shoal to 40 metres. The straits are not impassable to a dived submarine, but present uncomfortable risks: Turkey’s Type 209 boats need a minimum of 30 metres of water for safe dived navigation, leaving no room for error. Boats transiting the Mycale strait dived would suffer a high chance of detection, as they would pass only metres from Greece’s seabed border and whatever sonar, magnetic, IR or visual detection systems Greece has installed there. In practice, the Mycale strait is a turnstile wrapped in barbed wire and illuminated by floodlights. Since Greece has every right to extend its Aegean Territorial Zone to 22 km, an application to the ICJ to prevent that would have no chance of winning.
Aegean EEZs also on the table[.......................]
Will Turkey and Greece fight a war over East Mediterranean ...
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